China Coast Guard’s New Rules Raise the Stakes in the South China Sea

To go

China has introduced new maritime patrol regulations, also known as China Coast Guard Order No. 3authorize its coast guard to detain foreign vessels and persons for up to 60 days if it suspects they have illegally entered China’s territorial waters.

There are concerns that the rules, which came into effect on June 15, could lead to conflict with the Philippines in the South China Sea (SCS), where tensions over each other’s territorial claims are high.

In short

• According to order no. 3 China can detain any foreign vessel or person suspected of violating Chinese law in waters under “Chinese jurisdiction” for up to 60 days without trial. The new order is an update to China’s Coast Guard Law of 2021.
• The wording of Order No. 3 does not specify what falls under “China’s jurisdiction,” but it is assumed to include the maritime territory delineated by China’s “nine-dash line” — a disputed maritime boundary that Beijing says gives China sovereignty over most of the South China Sea.
• In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled by an overwhelming majority in favor of Manila’s territorial claims in the SCS. China has rejected the ruling and continues to claim that “indisputable sovereignty”over the area.
• Confrontations between Chinese and Filipino ships in SCS continue the highest level of all time from late 2023. The focal point of these confrontations is Second Thomas Shoal, an occasional destination for Filipino travelers civilian convoys asserting their fishing rights.
• On June 17, two days after Order No. 3 went into effect, a Philippine supply ship and a Chinese vessel he collided near Second Thomas Shoal, where Chinese forces reportedly used machetes, axes and hammers, causing injuries and damage to a Filipino boat.

Consequences

Manila takes a tone of rebellion. Philippine political and military leaders have been unequivocal in their response to both Order 3 and the June 17 confrontation. House Speaker Martin Romualdez described China’s “unilateral actions” as “an obvious escalation of tensions”; a Philippine Coast Guard spokesman called the moves “illegal“tools of coercion to justify Beijing’s “imaginary nine-dash line”; and General Romero Branwner Jr. of the Armed Forces of the Philippines he begged fishermen from his country “not to be afraid to fish in the West Philippine Sea” where the Second Thomas Shoal is located, adding that “it belongs to us.”

Manila’s partners and allies are on alertOn June 18, a U.S. State Department official confirmed Washington’s commitment to defend the Philippines in accordance with the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries. Experts to talk other governments will be watching for signs of U.S. deterrence strength. Also on June 18, Canada issued statement condemning China’s recent actions near Second Thomas Shoal. While the statement did not specifically mention Order No. 3, it condemned China’s “unilateral declaration of authority” and violation of international law.

Japan was also “we are closely monitoring events,” not only in the South China Sea but also near the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea — islands that China also claims and calls Diaoyu. On July 1, Japan’s Foreign Ministry issued statement referring to China’s 2021 Coast Guard Law and its “problematic provisions in terms of consistency with international law.” According to the Japanese reportingOver the past few months, Chinese ships have been seen passing near these islands almost daily.

Deputy Minority Leader of the House of Representatives of the Philippines France Castro summoned Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members have spoken out against China’s “blatant disregard for Philippine sovereignty,” but so far ASEAN members have largely remained silent.

Ambiguity increases the risk of misjudgment and misunderstandingOrder No. 3 reads as follows: wide and vague. For example, it would apply in circumstances such as “suspicion of illegal entry, exit or residence in (China’s specified borders)” or “prejudicing (China’s) national security and public order,” but it does not specify what these terms mean in practice. Similarly, it does not define the “necessary coercive measures or other law enforcement actions” that China could take to enforce the law. Some analysts suggest that the ambiguity is intendedpresumably to give Beijing room to maneuver in applying the new rules. Moreover, as one observer noted notesRegulation No. 3 “makes no distinction between state-owned and commercial vessels,” meaning that “foreign coast guard or warships” can be detained.

What’s next

1. Maintaining hope for de-escalation

On July 2, Chinese and Filipino officials met in Manila for “key talks” aimed at easing tensions. The meeting was the ninth session of their South China Sea Bilateral Consultation Mechanism. Although Beijing has not yet issued a statement, the Philippine side he said that while “significant progress” has been made in developing measures to manage tensions, “significant differences remain.”

2. Turning to international law

Philippines recently complex claim to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to strengthen its territorial claim over the extension of its continental seabed in the Western Palawan region. If successful, the Philippines would gain exclusive rights to the “explore and exploit natural resources”within the extensive seabed and subsoil.

3. Philippine-Vietnamese Diplomacy Over SCS Dispute

Significantly, on June 20, Vietnam, whose territorial claims in the South China Sea overlap with those of the Philippines, declared that willing talk to Manila and seek to identify measures that are in the interests of both countries.

• Editors: Erin Williams, Senior Program Manager, APF Canada; Maya Liu, Program Manager, APF Canada; Vina Nadjibulla, Vice President, Research and Strategy, APF Canada.