Khamenei places his hopes on a new government that will fend off foreign pressure

With the upcoming election of a new president in Tehran, there has been much speculation about the foreign policy direction of the new Iranian government.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who is widely considered to have the final say on foreign policy and other matters in Iran, has assured domestic and foreign audiences that a change of president is unlikely to result in any changes to Iran’s foreign policy. But the specter of Trump’s reelection is not a pleasant prospect for Khamenei, and the appearance of a more “moderate” government may be one of the few effective tools he can use to deflect more sanctions and pressure.

However, to respond to the demands of a nation whose patience is running out in the face of serious and long-term economic problems, the new president has promised to do everything in his power to improve the country’s relations with the outside world by trying to bring about the lifting of crippling international sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States and other countries.

The harshest sanctions on Iran were imposed after the US withdrew from the JCPOA nuclear deal in 2018. These sanctions have significantly affected Iran’s oil sales and international banking. As a result, Tehran’s ability to sell its oil on international markets has been limited, and the country faces challenges in repatriating revenues because it has to sell oil at discounted prices almost exclusively to China.

It is still unclear who will become the country’s new foreign minister. Traditionally, however, Iran’s so-called moderate governments have relied on disagreements between the United States and Europe, exploiting divisions to weaken a united front against the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program and its regional interventions.

Some of the latest reports from Tehran indicate that the new government is eager to pursue a path of lower tensions with the West. For example, a report on the pro-reform website Fararu says that Iran’s new government, which has not yet been officially formed, is likely to overhaul the country’s domestic and foreign policies.

However, it does not seem that easy because the new president Masood Pezeshkian’s fundamentalist rival, Saeed Jalili, threatened that the “revolutionary forces” will not allow the government to make any compromises on ideological values.

Fararu recalled that radicals opposed to better relations with the West lost the election, but did not lose political power. This serious challenge, according to the website, will influence every decision of the new government.

The new government will inevitably face several challenges, including winning approval for its cabinet ministers from the radical-dominated parliament. Some observers note that Pezeshkian maintains friendly relations with Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. But the key question is whether Ghalibaf can influence the radicals in parliament. The answer to that question will determine how easy or difficult it will be for Pezeshkian’s cabinet ministers to win a vote of confidence from the Majles.

The next challenge is getting foreign policy back on track. The unknown factor is Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s agenda. Does he want significant change or just the facade of a “reformist” government? Then Pezeshkian must deal with hardliners if he eventually tries to make concessions to the United States.

Another challenge will be to find a balance between relations with and dependence on the East and the West. Radicals in Iran refuse to accept that even China and Russia must work with the United States and Europe as trading partners and political rivals. People like Jalili have often been more anti-Western than Russia and China.

Leaving these challenges behind is not easy, given the weight and power of the radical media fleet, led by state radio and television, and the support of the Revolutionary Guard.

Pezeshkian, however, may have a counterweight that could silence the radicals: potential support from Khamenei. Iranians will see in a few months whether that support materializes. Even if it does, Pezeshkian may renege on his promise to end the repression of women who oppose the mandatory hijab. This is an area where Khamenei is likely to allow the radicals free rein, assuring them that they are not completely marginalized.