How Generation Z’s dream of transforming the country is being put on hold

For almost 70 years, between 1895 and 1963, Kenya was considered a “white man’s country.” Like Zimbabwe and South Africa (British), Algeria (French), and Namibia (German), Kenya was a special colony, a jewel in the crown of the British Empire, and increasingly of the West as a whole.

Kenya’s special place in the Western imagination is shown in America’s response to critical changes over the past six decades. At the height of the Cold War in the heady 1960s, America sent William Attwood as ambassador to ensure that Kenya was on an equal footing as a pro-Western nation. The outspoken American diplomat published a controversial autobiography: The Reds and the Blacks: A Personal Adventure (1967). As the Cold War ended, America sent another journalist, Smith Hempstone, as ambassador during the crucial interlude from 1989 to 1993. His memoir, Rogue Ambassador: An African Memoir (1997), reveals his mission in Kenya as pushing for multiparty elections and liberal democracy in a one-party Kenya. And in the 21st century, characterized by American geopolitical rivalry with China, in 2022 Washington sent Margaret (Meg) Whitman, an American business executive and billionaire (worth a modest $3.4 billion), as the United States ambassador to Kenya to contain China’s growing economic presence and restore American capital and Western financial institutions to influence in Kenya.

But how exactly has the Gen Z movement been humiliated? There are two distinct strategies. First, all manner of violence has been used to prevent the youth from peacefully gathering, including the use of plainclothes armed police, infiltration of their movement by hired thugs, kidnappings and killings. As a result, more than 55 protesters have been killed and scores more kidnapped since the demonstrations began in June, according to the state-funded Kenya National Human Rights Commission.

Second, to force Generation Z into submission, Kenya and its partners in the West have apparently resorted to the well-known “opposition strategy.”

The Western opposition strategy first appeared in the African Report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) entitled: Zimbabwe: An Opposition Strategy (N°117, 24 August 2006). The scenario of this strategy was tested in Zimbabwe and Kenya in 2008. One element of the strategy is to create and support an opposition leader, often a larger-than-life personality – exemplified by the two friends, Raila Odinga in Kenya and Morgan Tsvangirai in Zimbabwe. The second strand is to unite the opposition and civil society to create an opposition super movement with enormous political potential. The third is to persuade the government to share power with the opposition in a transitional government, giving Western actors control over the levers of policy-making in the government. In other words, the “Opposition Strategy” ensures that both the opposition and the government are safe for the West. This is the perfect neocolonial tool.

The Gen Z movement challenged the West’s opposition strategy. As such, it was seen as a potential cause of instability and an existential threat to Western interests.

The Gen Z movement recorded quick victories in June. President Ruto withdrew the controversial Finance Bill 2024; fired his entire cabinet and promised to form a new “broad-based” government. Former Inspector General of Police Japhet Koome resigned after being widely accused of extreme brutality against peaceful protesters. However, these gains were quickly reversed. Dr Ruto reappointed six CSs in the old cabinet and gave four positions to the opposition, including the powerful ministries of finance and energy. Ironically, while anger over the new cabinet appointments was part of the reason for the Nane Nane protests, the broad-based government managed to limit the protests to Nairobi and its surrounding areas. Major cities such as Kisumu (Raila’s hometown), Eldoret (Ruto’s hometown) and Mombasa (home to newly appointed opposition CSs Ali Joho and Opiyo Wandayi), which had previously seen protests, remained calm. This allowed the government to mobilise enough police to contain the protests in the capital. Although the organizers of the Nane Nane protests had hoped to bring five million Kenyans to the capital, the use of tear gas, the erection of blockades on major roads and the dispersal of protesters, and mass arrests prevented protesters from accessing the central business district.

Security was stepped up at the Capitol building where the new Cabinet was sworn in, with protesters threatening to storm the building.

The onus is now on the government to address the issues raised by the youth. So far, Kenya has been a perfect dialogue of the deaf. The government is focused on détente with the Raila wing of the opposition as an “alliance of rivals.” But Kenya’s youth protesters have dismissed the new cabinet as merely perpetuating the political elite’s connections, ignoring the serious governance issues they have raised.

Kenya no longer feels at ease. Its young people have vowed to continue demonstrating for justice for those killed or kidnapped and “until the president resigns.” In the corridors of diplomacy, on August 8, the United States warned that it would not accept any further kidnappings and killings of innocent protesters, calling for immediate action against human rights violations.

The dreams of young Kenyans may be on hold for now, but not for long.

Professor Peter Kagwanja is a former government adviser and currently the Executive Director of the Africa Policy Institute. Kagwanja is also the author of Killing the vote: state sponsored violence and flawed election in Kenya. A Kenya human rights commission report (Nairobi: Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), 1998).