The Future of U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation

This article examines three key themes related to the constitutional reform that would seek to militarize the Mexican National Guard (NG), further consolidating power in the executive branch. It is important to note that the militarization of public security is just one part of President López Obrador’s much more far-reaching agenda: transforming the current democratic regime into a populist and authoritarian one in which the armed forces assume an increasingly significant role and power.

Do we really know what NG is?

Since its creation in 2019, the NG has been caught in a deep contradiction between its declared civilian character (a condition demanded by opposition parties to ensure compliance with Article 21 of the Federal Constitution, which states that public security is a civilian task) and the president’s determination to make it a military organization. This tension is obvious: the military personnel, commanders and equipment that the NG operates in military barracks were initially dependent on the Secretariat of Security and Civil Protection (SSPC).

This led to significant budgetary, administrative, and staffing simulations. Although the guards were not intended to be military personnel, they were seconded by the military. However, because they retained their military status, they were not allowed to serve as police officers. This prevented them from making arrests or filing standard police reports, as such actions would be considered illegal and invalid in court. Furthermore, the actual cost of the National Guard remains unclear, with the budget being provided on ambiguous terms by the Secretariat of Defense (Sedena) and the SSPC. The number of guards is equally uncertain: while the official number is 133,000, there are no more than 37,000 positions, meaning that around 100,000 soldiers are posing as guards.

The NG’s resistance to everything civilian has become stronger. Not only have they discriminated against and humiliated the few federal police officers who have tried to join the NG, but they have also expelled the few who remain; the proposed reform calls for their immediate transfer — without a position — to the SSPC. The contradictions and the great simulation of the composition of the National Guard continue to grow. The situation has become so acute that the Supreme Court ruling that ordered the NG — now illegally assigned to Sedena — to return to the SSCP since January of last year has been ignored, a directive that has not been fulfilled.

To complicate matters further, the NG’s mission has never been clear. It has been tasked with everything from protecting Mexico City’s subway system to distributing construction materials in Acapulco. While it has a territorial presence in 260 regions across the country, it does not protect highways, as evidenced by the spike in thefts of goods on federal highways since 2015. What’s more, it has failed to dismantle a single criminal organization, despite operating checkpoints in areas of extreme violence and insecurity—often just feet from checkpoints set up by criminal groups. What exactly are their orders? Are they tasked with policing rural regions or border areas? No one seems to know. Their primary activity seems to be stopping migrants in the country’s southeast. In short, the NG remains an institution without a clear mission, mandate, or set of directives.

So, to fully understand what the NG is, how it is organized, what its mission is, and what it does, we should first focus on transparency and accountability. Furthermore, it is unclear how the violation of the constitution will be resolved, since Article 21—unchanged in the proposed reform—orders that institutions responsible for public security be civilian. Despite this, the authorities insist, without hesitation or shame, that the NG will remain a civilian institution, although it is part of the military, run by military commanders, composed exclusively of military personnel, and operating within the military structure, discipline, and hierarchy. They claim that the civilian aspect will come from providing police training, not military training. If this happens, we will have military personnel performing police duties. This contradiction with the constitutional mandate seems to raise little concern.

Is the National Guard the right institution to resolve the crisis of security and violence in Mexico?

Let’s assume—although it’s a bit of an ambitious assumption—that one day the military NG under Sedena’s control will actually have 133,000 members (with their dedicated positions, not soldiers simply changing uniforms) and will receive some form of police training. We need to consider why it is not appropriate for a military institution to be responsible for public and civilian security. Here are some reasons:

The logic of the military is not the same as that of civilian police. Even if they receive police training, the guards who were originally soldiers (at least 100,000 of them) and received military training will at best combine military logic (eliminate the enemy) with police logic (detain a suspect). At worst, the former will win (e.g. shooting civilians who fail to stop at checkpoints). It may be more effective to train new police officers from scratch than to try to change the “military mindset” of current guards.

Military logic focuses on centralized command, blind obedience, and strict hierarchy, which contrasts with the need for coordination and cooperation among federal, state, and municipal levels of government. Adequate public security requires coordination, not only as a legal obligation but as a practical necessity. However, recent experiences in Mexico have shown the challenges that armed forces face in truly accepting coordinated or shared command. The military tends to despise civilian police forces and distrust their institutions (as seen in their treatment of federal police officers). They have shown similar attitudes toward state police.

Dismantling the 250 criminal gangs (in addition to the drug cartels) operating throughout Mexico requires intelligence and knowledge that only local police forces possess—something that the military often fails to recognize. Without a strong, reliable, and effective local police force, the NG’s efforts will be insufficient. Successful cases of reducing violence and insecurity (in Ciudad Juarez, Monterrey, La Laguna, Tampico, etc.) have been driven by local initiatives, using grassroots models with broad citizen participation and close collaboration with city and state authorities, in stark contrast to centralized military approaches.

Dual command and operations pose another challenge. Under the proposed reform, the SSCP would formulate a National Public Security Strategy and related programs, policies, and activities. However, it would lack the operational capacity to implement them, relying instead on military command. While military commanders are expected to follow the president’s orders to follow the strategy and coordinate with new Secretary Omar García Harfuch, experience has shown that these dual command systems often lead to serious coordination problems. Initial cooperation may proceed smoothly, but tensions and conflicts are likely to arise over time, especially at lower levels of both secretariats.

A final concern related to militarization is the risk of infiltration of the military by organized crime, which is traditionally the last line of defense of the state in maintaining constitutional order. It is undeniable that under the current administration, criminal organizations have made significant progress in attempting to take over state institutions through violence or collusion with political parties and officials. Suspicions of complicity of mayors, governors and party leaders, together with the increasing involvement of criminals in elections, reflect the growing link between politics and organized crime. In this context, how can we ensure that the military or NG remain free from corruption? The consequences of such corruption would be serious.

Militarize the security relationship with the United States?

Coordination between the United States and Mexico to increase the effectiveness of security policies and achieve results in terms of impact (reduced violence, increased fentanyl seizures, dismantling of criminal organizations, etc.) and governance (sharing intelligence, strengthening security institutions, etc.) requires:

Rebuilding Trust. After General Cienfuegos, the anti-DEA laws, the anti-fentanyl simulation, and the misleading rendition/kidnapping of Mayo Zambada, trust between the two governments is virtually nonexistent. Assume there is no radical change in the “hugs, not bullets” policy and no real and profound strategy to attack the conspiracy and corruption of civilian and military authorities with criminal organizations. The US is unlikely to believe in Mexico’s willingness to cooperate and there will be little trust in the new government. Sedena may have no problem ending the “hugs,” but her willingness to investigate and impose sanctions remains to be tested. Likewise, if the US does not stop unilateral actions and investigations against Mexican officials and military based solely on the statements (without hard evidence) of drug traffickers who have become protected witnesses, Mexico will have similar difficulties trusting its neighbor.

Coordination between agencies in each country and the actual leadership of each government. The fact that in Mexico the operational part of security is the military (GN) and the command is civilian (SSC) will generate constant tensions due to the military culture of ignoring all orders from outside the military, except the President of the Republic. This dynamic will probably lead to a dispute over the coordination of relations with the US government. Moreover, it could also cause conflicts in cross-border relations, since on the US side such conflicts are in the hands of civilian agencies (DEA, DHS, FBI, etc.) and not the army. The question arises, who will lead the operational relations with the NG: the DEA and the agency with which it has long cultivated a relationship full of conflict and distrust? Will it be the Northern Command? Also, US agencies attach greater importance to operational issues (capture of capos), so direct relations with the Armed Forces, Army or Navy, will take priority over relations with Garcia Harfuch, who is expected to become the head of the Mexican government for security relations.

These objections to the militarization of the NG and public safety do not preclude the possibility of ultimate success. However, this reform likely means that success will be much more difficult to achieve. It means more human rights violations and high social and political costs. Dismantling the NG command structure will prolong the harm and suffering of millions of Mexicans affected by various forms of violence and property crimes, further weaken civilian security institutions; unnecessarily complicate cooperative relations with the US; and worsen the imbalance between civilian and military power, tilting the military in favor, which poses significant risks to Mexico’s already fragile democracy.