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Why losing the White House could be the ultimate win

What really constitutes a political victory? In the 2024 elections, both political camps have clearly defined winning the presidential race as a success, which in turn influences their strategies.

This election cycle has a historically unusual premise: A short-term victory for either party in the 2024 presidential election has a strong chance of giving the opposing party several more wins in the election cycle that can also be leveraged in Congress and the executive branch.

I suggest that the current strategies of both parties to secure power are fundamentally flawed and based on the short-term “go for it” goal of winning the presidency.

For example, the four years of the Carter administration created a positive Doppler effect for the GOP that radiated forward. This resulted in three consecutive Republican presidential victories with steady growth in both legislative bodies, leading to the first GOP-controlled chamber in the 40-year Clinton administration.

According to Gallup, Jimmy Carter began his administration with an approval rating of 66 percent, which dropped to 34 percent after his departure. This was mainly due to the perception of failed policies.

In retrospect, we can look at President Ford’s defeat by Carter in the 1976 presidential election as a breakthrough event that accelerated the rise to power of Ronald Reagan and the reorganization of the Republican Party. This reframing illustrates how a short-term defeat of an unpopular presidential candidate can catalyze long-term political gains for the losing party.

Let’s fast forward to the current election cycle and the two candidates. Real Clear Politics reports favorability ratings below 50 percent for both Harris and Trump. Both candidates will be climbing out of a deeper hole at the beginning of the presidential term, with almost 20% less support than Carter. Combining this with perceived failures in policy and leadership can generate similar or even greater positive Doppler effects for the opposing party.

For example, a Trump victory could result in a revenge of the presidency, as the candidate has repeatedly announced his intention to take revenge on political opponents using the full powers of the executive branch.

Trump’s polarizing personality has generated a general public disdain that borders on the anaphylactic, in what some call Trump Disorder Syndrome. Even within the GOP, Trump has alienated parts of the party between “never Trump supporters” and those who will reluctantly vote for him.

If this combines with perceived failed policies (particularly when it comes to the economy and the border crisis), it could generate significant long-term gains in the election cycle for Democrats in the legislative and executive branches.

A suitable loss of Harris would allow Democrats to regroup around a candidate backed by a legal nomination process, who is less fictionalized and who wasn’t forced to inherit the platform from someone else overnight.

Moreover, Democrats under Biden-Harris have been balkanized into factions over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The party needs time to build consensus on this divisive issue, and that can best be done away from the spotlight of the Oval Office. During this time, the party can refine policy goals related to its core ideals of wealth redistribution, DEI, and climate change, recasting these ideals as a way to build a sustainable, healthy economy.

A Trump victory could also liberate Democrats from the generational constraints that hinder the inevitable shedding of classical liberalism and accelerate the party’s current evolution toward full-fledged postmodern progressivism. The party may be reborn in four years, united around a refreshed and refined political platform, with a strong and distinctive candidate who has passed the legal nomination procedure.

What happens if Harris wins? While Harris has re-energized the Democratic base and appears strong compared to Trump, there are concerns that if she wins, her ultra-progressive policies could alienate the bell curve of the American electorate, positioned between the center-left and right. This will be especially true if her policies fail to address the border crisis, high interest rates and growing fears of a recession.

There was also an allegation by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) that Harris was not sincere in her rhetorical departures from the party platform. The idea is that once elected, he will return to an extremely progressive form. If Sanders is right, this massive fraud will excite voters and stimulate a powerful and long-term Doppler effect for the Republican Party.

A suitable defeat of Trump would liberate the GOP from the grip of the cult of personality that has defined the party over the past four election cycles (including 2024), leading to eight major losses over that period. The party could begin the process of redefining itself around policy goals sufficient to attract a majority of Americans, which could translate into long-term power in the executive and legislative branches.

The GOP would have four years to unite around a less polarizing leader who speaks on the party’s most important issues and maturely appreciates the role of the presidency in historical context.

Whoever wins this race will be a shin. The RealClearPolitics polling average shows both Harris and Trump as almost dead, even though the general election is about 40 days away. Both candidates are within the margin of error in battleground states. Victory is unlikely to win a government seat for either candidate or give congressional and Senate candidates a cloak advantage on the ballot.

Whoever wins will likely begin another presidential term with a closely divided Senate and House, and with Trump as a lame duck, he will be barred from running for re-election.

This legislative impasse should allay concerns about tyrannical excesses and claims by both sides about the “end of democracy,” which appear to be greatly exaggerated. While Harris and Trump’s actions should not be discounted through presidential executive actions, previous newly elected presidents have succeeded in leading strong executive actions to overturn the actions of previous administrations.

What has been done can also be undone, although we should not expect campaign officials to devise strategies to sink their own presidential candidate or allow voters to check the opposition party’s box.

I only suggest that disaffected voters on the losing side find solace in this unusual election cycle. Losing the presidency in 2024 could be the event that ensures a more lasting and long-term victory for their political party.

Stephen Lile is a Strategy and Innovation Officer at Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.

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