The Russian army does not have enough resources to continue an intensified offensive

According to Ukrinform, the Institute for War Studies (ISW) think tank stated this in a new report.

The report notes that Russian forces have recently made significant tactical progress but have not demonstrated the ability to achieve operationally significant objectives. ISW distinguishes between tactical gains, which are significant at the tactical level of war in close proximity to combat, and operational gains, which are significant at the operational level of war and affect large sections of the entire front line.

ISW analysts believe that Russia’s capture of Vuhledar will not, in itself, radically change the operational situation in the western Donetsk Oblast, and Russian forces will likely have difficulty achieving their operational objectives in the area during the ongoing offensive operation in the western Donetsk Oblast.

“Russian offensive operations that pursue operationally significant objectives, such as Russian efforts to capture Khasov Yar or push Ukrainian forces off the left (eastern) bank of the Oskil River, have either stalled or resulted in particularly gradual gains over long stretches of time.” – we read in the report.

According to ISW analysts, the Russian military command prepared the ongoing Russian offensive operation in the summer of 2024 many months in advance and accumulated operational reserves and resources for the operation, which were likely to be significantly damaged in the last months of devastating fighting.

Russian forces reportedly aimed to establish a new operational force group with uncommitted operational reserves of up to 70,000 troops for an offensive operation in the northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024, as well as to establish operational reserves for an attack by the Central Force Group on Pokrovsk this summer . Russian forces likely spent a significant portion of these reserves on delaying the offensive operation in the northern Kharkiv Oblast, increasing the pace of the offensive towards Pokrovsk and the western Donetsk Oblast, and responding to the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk Oblast.

Russian forces continue to suffer heavy armored vehicle losses from large, unsuccessful mechanized attacks across the front line, particularly in the western Donetsk Oblast. ISW predicts that Russian forces are likely to have stockpiled a large amount of equipment for such mechanized attacks, but significant medium- and long-term constraints on Russian armored vehicles will become increasingly apparent as losses mount and may force the Russian military command to rethink the benefits of such mechanized attacks . continuation of such increased mechanized activity in Ukraine. Russia’s continued severe attrition in the Donetsk Oblast and continued Russian redeployment into the Kursk Oblast will weaken Russia’s ability to maintain offensive operations in northeastern and eastern Ukraine, although Russian forces are more likely to continue to limit offensive activity on low-impact front sectors. priority than they will do. so evenly across the entire front line.

According to the ISW report, the current Russian offensive operation in the summer of 2024 is “likely to end in the coming weeks and months,” but Russian forces may nevertheless continue to conduct offensive operations at a much slower pace across Ukraine in the hope that consistent offensive pressure will prevent forces Ukraine muster the manpower and resources necessary to contest a theater-wide initiative.