How Russia is targeting Moldova’s path to the EU

On June 25, 2024, the EU started accession negotiations with Moldova, which is a significant step in deepening the country’s integration with the Euro-Atlantic structures. As Moldova prepares for the crucial presidential elections and EU membership referendum scheduled for October 20, 2024, Russia is mobilizing its resources to destabilize Moldova from within.

Chess: Russia’s historical strategy

In geopolitics, unexpected encounters often signal profound shifts in power dynamics. Earlier this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Evgenia Guțul, the governor of a small autonomous region of Moldova called Gagauzia. This seemingly unremarkable meeting tells the nuanced story of Russia’s strategic maneuvers in Eastern Europe. He suggests that paying attention to events in seemingly insignificant places like Gagauzia can reveal the threads of a grand strategy woven by world powers.

For decades, the Kremlin has used small regions like chess pieces, pushing them around in an attempt to destabilize the political climate in their countries. Like its post-Soviet counterparts – Georgian Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the Ukrainian Donbas and Crimea – the Moldavian regions of Gagauzia and Transnistria were targets of Russian imperial aspirations. While Transnistria is a self-proclaimed breakaway state with a Russian military presence, Gagauzia, although an autonomous region, remains under the authority of Moldova. This is where Moscow focuses its plans.

The experiences of Ukraine and Georgia spell trouble for Moldova. Russian imperialism often begins with attempts to destabilize separate regions, but sooner or later it escalates into full-scale war. This pattern suggests that Moldova is one step away from significant geopolitical challenges as one of Russia’s strategic goals.

Recent events in Gagauzia

Recent tensions between Gagauzia and the central government of Moldova have escalated mainly due to President Mai Sandu’s strong pro-Ukrainian stance and aspirations for EU membership.

Gagauzia, Moldova’s poorest region, maintains strong loyalty to Russia. In a 2014 referendum, a majority of Gagauz citizens voted in favor of integration with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, even though the region benefits from significant EU funds for modernization. Since Evghenia Guțul became governor of Gagauzia in 2023, Russian involvement in the region has gained momentum.

Guțul comes from in the southern Moldova city of Etulia, where fragments of a Russian Shahed drone carrying 110 pounds of explosives that was shot down in neighboring Ukraine were found in February this year. He represents a pro-Russian party led by Ilan Shor, an oligarch sanctioned by the United States, Britain and the EU for cooperating with Russia in efforts to overthrow the government of Moldova. Shor fled to Russia after being involved in a massive fraud that led to the disappearance of $1 billion from Moldovan banks, resulting in a total loss of 12 percent of Moldova’s GDP. Now the new field leader is Evghenia Guțul.

Since meeting President Putin in March 2023, Guțul has participated in several pro-Russian meetings. On May 9, she had the “honor of representing Gagauzia and all of Moldova” at the Victory Parade in Moscow. She then attended the congress of the Moldovan opposition bloc “Victory” in Moscow, where she held another round of meetings with Russian officials. Later, at the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg, Guțul inaugurated the Moldavian Court – a stand with national music, Moldovan wine tastings and ethnic cuisine, which presented Moldovan culture and aimed to emphasize the desire for true friendship and cooperation with Russia.

Economic and political maneuvers and disinformation

The primary goal of pro-Russian factions in Moldova is to sabotage the upcoming presidential elections and the referendum on EU membership scheduled for October 2024. Their tactics include conducting disinformation campaigns, exerting economic pressure and using the authority of religious institutions to support anti-EU sentiment among the population.

While Moldova is actively seeking EU membership, Gagauzia, under Guțul’s leadership, is strengthening agricultural trade with Russia. Recent bilateral agreements between Gagauzia and the Russian regions of St. Petersburg and Tatarstan aim to build mutual trade flows. The agreements provide for various incentives, including gas discounts, benefits for exporters and access to Russian payment infrastructure.

Even though the National Bank of Moldova banned Russian card payment methods due to Western sanctions, after meeting with President Putin, Guțul agreed to allow Russia’s Promsvyazbank to create remote bank accounts for Gagauz residents, allowing Russian banks to distribute monthly benefits to public sector workers and retirees. About 130,000 Moldovans received between 900 and 1,800 lei a month from Promsvyazbank provided they voted “No” in the referendum on joining the European Union.

The Russian Orthodox Church, as an organization controlled by the Kremlin, is another tool of power in the Russian arsenal of hybrid warfare. The ROC promotes alleged cultural and historical connections between Russia and Gaugazia to strengthen the sense of belonging to Russia’s heritage. The Church’s presence at local political events and its self-portrait as a defender of traditional values ​​against Western secularism strengthen the perception of Russia as a defender of Orthodoxy. Guțul criticized the Moldovan authorities for dividing the Orthodox community and manipulating church affiliation for political purposes, deepening the fear of conflict and war among the Gagauz nation: “The Gagauz nation is an Orthodox nation. . . . We are afraid of war.”