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Voice and exit in repairing labor market harm resulting from anticompetitive mergers

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Antitrust analysis and policy has recently shown renewed interest in labor market harms resulting from mergers that significantly reduce labor market competition. Unlocked merger countermeasures typically focus on the exit as the sole source of countervailing force. At the same time, there has been a resurgence of interest in trade unions and labor organizations, classic sources of “voice-based” countervailing power. We discuss how merger remedies can take union neutrality into account, charter c

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