How the US Should Win Against Armenia | Opinion

As the war in Ukraine drags on and the Middle East becomes more unstable than ever, it is becoming clear that the world is not heading in the direction Washington wants it to.

Regardless, when one door closes, check the window.

Over the past few years, an extremely important region has begun to move away from Russia towards the West – these are the countries of the South Caucasus: Armenia and Azerbaijan.

This region, in the backyards of Russia and Iran, could eventually provide a trade route from China to Europe that bypasses Moscow and Tehran. Such a route—the so-called Middle Corridor—would give the West access to Central Asia’s energy and minerals, avoiding shipments not only through Russia and Iran but also through China.

This is now possible because the bitter ethnic war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian separatist enclave within Azerbaijan, has ended. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia has abandoned its extraterritorial claims and sought peace. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which began in 1988, was one of many instigated by Russian-backed separatists in the post-Soviet space, including South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria. In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Moscow has played both sides, selling weapons to both Baku and Yerevan.

This has now led both nations to seek closer ties with the West. Azerbaijan has been a key energy partner for Europe, as Brussels seeks to abandon Russian oil and gas and Armenia seeks European integration.

Although Azerbaijan has maintained trade relations with its neighbors, including Russia and Iran, it has never become dependent on either. Armenia, however, remains dependent on Russia and Iran economically and militarily. To combat the militarily superior Azerbaijan for more than three decades, Yerevan has sacrificed its independence.

Since Pashinyan was elected after a popular revolution in 2018, he has tried to lead Armenia out of Russia’s sphere of influence. He has promised to leave the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), held joint exercises with U.S. forces, hinted at an attempt to join the European Union and sought alternative military partners.

Still, Russia remains Armenia’s largest trading partner. Earlier this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russian-Armenian trade had reached a record $7 billion last year. Russia accounts for about 40 percent of Armenia’s exports, and Yerevan relies on Moscow for essential goods like grain and energy. So while Armenia is trying to reorient itself toward the West, it remains one of Russia’s largest partners in avoiding sanctions, and has even helped Russia import banned U.S. microchips used in cruise missiles.

Even more disturbing are Armenia’s growing relations with Iran.

Pashinyan recently attended the inauguration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and met with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The visit comes on the heels of the announcement of a $500 million secret arms deal between the two countries that includes intelligence cooperation, suicide drones and the establishment of Iranian bases on Armenian soil. Both Armenia and Iran deny the existence of such a deal.

One of the lessons Armenia learned from losing the Nagorno-Karabakh region to Azerbaijan is that it cannot rely on a single guarantor of security, as it did with Russia. That is why Yerevan has been rapidly diversifying over the past few years, particularly in the defense sector. Armenia has increased its defense budget by 81 percent and established military partnerships with India, France, Greece, the United States, and Cyprus.

Despite such diversification, regional experts expect Armenia to remain dependent on Russian weapons for a long time. That is why David Karapetyan, an analyst and diplomat from Yerevan, said Armenia needs an arms deal with Iran.

Like Russia, Iran exploits its allies, seeking to weaken and render them dependent. Leaders in Yerevan need look no further than Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen to see Iran’s modus operandi—undermining allies while supporting irregular forces such as militias. In Armenia, Tehran already has close ties with the anti-government Apostolic Church.

Before the West backs Armenia, it should consider that military agreements with Yerevan, which remains so close to hostile powers like Russia and Iran, could lead to wasted investment, leaks, and worse.

Armenia’s neighbor, Georgia, is a prime example. For years, Georgia tried to move West, but was eventually pulled back into Russia’s orbit. During that time, the U.S. poured resources into joint military cooperation, shared intelligence, and invested more than $6 billion. As one American journalist based there put it, it was left with “an exposed flank in the ongoing and accelerating conflict with Russia.”

There are signs that the Biden administration understands the importance of the region. During a July hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, administration officials said the U.S. was considering a new land route through Armenia and Azerbaijan and should help Yerevan cut ties with Moscow.

While supporting Armenia is the right course of action, the United States must understand that it is not the only power vying for influence in this crucial region. Countries such as Russia, Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, and France have invested heavily in Yerevan or Baku.

However, unlike countries that have backed Armenia or Azerbaijan, or countries like Russia and Iran that prefer a conflict between the two, Washington is prepared to provide support to both countries, thereby helping to facilitate peace.

However, lasting peace and stability cannot be achieved if either Russia or Iran maintain significant influence in the region. While Armenia has the right to diversify its global partners, close military coordination with the West must be based on the absence of such cooperation with Iran or Russia.

Joseph Epstein is legislative director at the Endowment for Middle East Truth (EMET) and a research fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author.