India’s Struggle to Find a Meaningful Role in Southeast Asia – The Diplomat

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Singapore and Brunei Darussalam in early September underscored once again the enormous importance of Southeast Asia in India’s foreign policy – not only for strategic and economic reasons, but also because India cannot credibly claim to be a global power unless it demonstrates that it can play a significant role in its own extended neighbourhood. The Indian government has sought to Look/Act East policy for three decades aimed at strengthening it security, tradeAND cultural presence in the ASEAN region. “For India, no region is getting as much attention as this one right now,” Modi said decided at the Shangri La Dialogue in 2018.

But after 30 years of Look/Act East, the relationship has not taken off on its own, and India has struggled to carve out a meaningful role for itself in Southeast Asia. Over the past six years, The State of Southeast Asia (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute) surveys found that the region’s elites consistently rank India lowest among all major powers in terms of its strategic, political, or economic influence in Southeast Asia. In 2024, nearly 2,000 respondents from academia, governments, and civil society across the region classified India ranks ninth among the 11 major powers in terms of strategic importance to ASEAN countries.

A key reason for India’s inability to carve out a larger regional role is the fundamental divergence in its international approach. While Southeast Asian countries are not monolithic, they have developed a broad consensus on four key issues. India maintains a distinctly different view on all four.

First, as small countries facing serious external threats, Southeast Asians support and wish to strengthen the existing US-led rules-based global order, despite some concerns. ISEAS-Yusuf Ishak questionnaire shows that regional elites still favor US leadership in the world. On the other hand, India, he is marrying multipolar world. Despite improving relations with the United States, he has often expressed skepticism about US global leadership. The ongoing war in Ukraine is a clear example of the stark divide between India and Southeast Asian countries. While most of the region has supported United Nations resolutions condemning the Russian invasion, India has consistently refrained from vote against the interests of Moscow.

Secondly, Southeast Asian countries have adopted a relatively firm but friendly stance approach toward China. Although they feared Beijing’s growing assertiveness, they sought mutually beneficial economic cooperation and tried to avoid a long-term confrontation with it. They were careful not to get drawn into the emerging rivalry between China and the US. Meanwhile, India’s relations with China deteriorated rapidly got worse Following a 2020 border skirmish, New Delhi views Beijing as a strategic and economic rival and increasingly sees its presence in Southeast Asia as a direct competitor to China. This zero-sum mentality has left many in the region feeling uneasy.

Third, export-dependent Southeast Asian countries are broadly supportive of liberal international trade, while India is often ambivalent and hesitant to open its markets. While vocation for an “open” Indo-Pacific, the Modi government also promoted protectionist policies under the “Make in India” campaign. In line with latest data According to the World Trade Organization, the average import tax in India is 18.3 percent, while in Southeast Asia it ranges from 0 to 11.5 percent. In 2019, India he withdrew an ASEAN-centered free trade agreement, called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), at the last minute. India trade deficit with Southeast Asia has grown rapidly over the past two decades and now accounts for almost a quarter of total trade, making it all the more wary of keeping the market open to the region’s manufacturing hubs.

The final point of differentiation is regional multilateralism, a highly prized feature of Southeast Asian politics. ASEAN is one of the world’s most successful regional organizations, instrumental in promoting peace and economic cooperation in the region. In contrast, India is a reluctant regionalist. Historically, New Delhi has preferred to do business with its smaller South Asian neighbors bilaterally rather than multilaterally. South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world, with moribund regional forums. While New Delhi has sought to act as a constructive partner to ASEAN, it has yet to demonstrate that it can champion regional cooperation and lead in establishing and managing regional institutions.

The divergence between India’s and Southeast Asia’s international perspectives limits what Look/Act East can achieve. India’s investments in the region through trade agreements or military exercises are unlikely to bridge the gap. Indeed, as the international order comes under increasing strain, differences over such first-order principles will become increasingly apparent. To establish itself as a significant regional actor, India must consciously seek common ground with Southeast Asian countries on fundamental issues of regional order. Rather than assuming that others will follow suit, it must invest in understanding the needs and perspectives of its neighbours in order to encourage a united front in meeting future challenges.

To lead Asia, India will have to rethink some of the basic tenets of its worldview.