It would be a mistake for Israel to invade Lebanon – here’s why

The death of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut on September 27 has left the militant Lebanese organization leaderless at a critical moment. Two days earlier, in a speech broadcast around the world, the head of the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) Northern Command, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, told his troops to prepare for a possible invasion of Lebanon.

There is every reason to believe that Friday’s raid, which targeted Hezbollah’s headquarters in Beirut’s southern suburb of Dahiyeh, was preparation for a possible incursion. This followed days of strikes that Israel said eliminated much of Hezbollah’s leadership.

On September 25, Halevi told his troops that they would “go in, destroy the enemy there and decisively destroy” Hezbollah’s infrastructure. Because Hezbollah is embedded in Lebanese society, this strategy promises the death of innocent civilians.

Since 2006, both Hezbollah and the IDF have tried to avoid direct confrontation. For years, they played tit for tat based on the principle of proportionality to prevent total war.

Although Hamas’ horrific October 7 attacks on Israel sparked renewed hostilities, until last week both sides had called for restraint. What has changed? Is a ground invasion now inevitable? And if so, what would this mean for Hezbollah and Lebanon?

Israel has a track record of engaging in military adventures in Lebanon, which in the long run only served to strengthen its opponents. The destruction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) did not prevent the rise of Hamas – in fact, it helped create it. Similarly, Israel’s pursuit of the PLO in southern Lebanon sparked the creation of Hezbollah. Despite five invasions since 1978, Israel has shown that it is unable to successfully occupy even the smallest piece of Lebanese land.

Although both sides had been preparing for a new conflict for years, the trigger for escalation began on September 18, when Israel struck the first blow by detonating thousands of pagers and mobile devices belonging to Hezbollah operatives, killing at least 32 people and injuring several thousand people.

This technological attack has been years in the making and can be described as a strategic, masterstroke to neutralize the enemy. This moment seems to have come because Hezbollah became suspicious of these devices, so the IDF had to act or lose the “surprise”. This suggests that operational considerations take precedence over strategic and political ones, which research shows is rarely a good idea.

Nevertheless, these attacks are believed to have paralyzed Hezbollah’s command in the short term and emboldened the IDF leadership. On September 18, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told Israeli soldiers: “We are at the beginning of a new phase of the war – it requires courage, determination and perseverance.” Although he did not mention the explosive devices, he praised the work of the Israeli army and security agencies, noting that their results had been excellent.

The tactics used by the IDF in recent days are ones that have been developed over many years on the “blue line” – the de facto border dividing Israel and Lebanon. Emboldened by the IDF’s failure to defeat them in the 2006 July War, senior Hezbollah operatives were active and visible on the Blue Line, which is closely monitored by the IDF.

This enabled the IDF to photograph, identify and track Hezbollah’s senior leadership, which is why since October 7 we have witnessed a series of assassinations of key Hezbollah operatives, including Ibrahim Aqeel, commander of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force, and most recently Mohammed Sarour in Beirut, among many others.

The IDF now believes it has Hezbollah on its knees – or at least on one knee. The escalation we are currently witnessing is the IDF taking advantage of its advantage and employing the same strategy as in Gaza: bombing any area it can credibly believe to be a Hezbollah target.

This had devastating consequences for the people of Lebanon. The Ministry of Health said on Friday that 1,540 people have been killed and thousands of innocent civilians injured since October 8, 2023. More than 70,000 civilians are reported to have registered in 533 shelters across Lebanon, and an estimated 1 million people have been displaced from their homes.

Can Hezbollah fight back?

Nasrallah’s death left Hezbollah temporarily leaderless, while the killing of several of its top figures deprived it of experienced commanders, many of whom had recent combat experience in Syria. And bombings of southern Lebanon are limiting Hezbollah’s supplies of rockets and other weapons.

However, Israel should not assume that Hezbollah is out of the game or underestimate the group. Hezbollah’s real strength has always been in its ability to blend into society – and it will be ready to launch a war of attrition using hit-and-run tactics if the IDF makes the mistake of putting its feet on the ground again. The fact that all five previous invasions failed should indicate that the outcome could be a repeat of what occurred between 1982 and 2006.

Moreover, while Iran’s response to the escalation has been muted so far, Iran is unlikely to abandon Hezbollah. A long, drawn-out, low-intensity conflict would favor asymmetric tactics used by the “axis of resistance,” which also includes Lebanon’s neighbor Syria.

By bombing and displacing the Lebanese population, the IDF aims to lower morale. It is currently destroying private homes and public buildings in the area where Hezbollah’s ammunition and weapons depots are located.

In Lebanon, the Palestine issue has always been considered the main cause of the civil war that took place from 1975 to 1990. As such, the IDF is counting on the Lebanese to turn against Hezbollah for bringing upon them a new war with its rocket fire into northern Israel, in solidarity with Hamas since the October 7 attack.

But while there are many people in Lebanon who do not support Hezbollah and its activities in southern Lebanon, the IDF should remember the past. Even if sentiment against Hezbollah is high today, the massive bombings we are currently seeing in Lebanon will not be tolerated by the population indefinitely.

It is worth noting that in 1982, when the IDF invaded southern Lebanon, some Lebanese welcomed them with rice and flowers – seeing them as liberators from the PLO. But this welcome did not last long.

In 2006, the IDF used a similar strategy, targeting civilian evacuation convoys and UN facilities. And once again the tide of public opinion quickly turned in favor “al-muqawimah” (resistance).

The IDF’s stated goal is to drive Hezbollah back north of the Litani River, force it to comply with UN Resolution 1701, and allow displaced people in northern Israel to return to their homes. However, it is naive on the part of Israel and the IDF to believe that an invasion or bombing campaign, no matter how effective it is in the short term, will enable Israeli civilians to live in peace along the Blue Line in the long term.

Ultimately, the only solution is for both parties to come to the table and negotiate. The human costs of Israel’s current strategy in Lebanon are terrifying to consider and will likely result in more hatred – supporting a new generation of anti-Israel militants rather than laying the foundations for lasting peace.