As Gaza faces unprecedented devastation, experts and analysts question Hamas’s ability to maintain its traditional internal rules for selecting a new leader following Israel’s assassination of Yahya Sinwar.

The movement, which usually depends on elections and Shura Council processes from the grassroots to the top leadership, is now likely to follow a different path thanks to consensus and understanding among its different organizational levels to choose a new head of his political office and other key positions.

This significant departure from established protocols comes against a backdrop of extraordinary circumstances that make traditional electoral processes virtually impossible.

The Israeli military’s control over the Gaza Strip, coupled with the growing risks facing Hamas leaders in host countries like Lebanon, Iran, Qatar and others, has created a challenge without precedent for the organization’s selection process.

The situation has been further complicated by Israel’s systematic targeting of the Hamas leadership structure. Last Thursday’s announcement of Yahya Sinwar’s death was another blow to the organization’s command structure.

Sinwar’s leadership began after the assassination of former leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31, while the deputy head of the Politburo, Saleh Al-Arouri, was killed on January 2. Israel previously announced the assassination of Al-Qassam Brigades commander Mohammed Deif, several members of the military council, as well as numerous brigade leaders across Gaza.

Esmat Mansour, a former Palestinian prisoner currently in Gaza who shared time with Sinwar in various Israeli prisons, including Ashkelon, Hadarim and Beersheba, offered The new Arabic a unique insight into the character of the fallen leader.

“Even though his ideas about resistance and jihad were indeed extreme and rigid,” Mansour said TNA“Sinwar was not suicidal. He was rational and pragmatic, believing in truces and long-term political arrangements.”

According to Mansour, the scale of the Israeli response to the October 7 Hamas attack took Sinwar by surprise. “He never anticipated Israel’s completely destructive response,” says Mansour.

“He also did not expect that the (Hamas) military operation would succeed in crossing the borders between Gaza and Israel or the sudden collapse of the Israeli security system. The chaos that followed, with the participation small armed groups and civilians, appeared to exceed the scope of the initial planning objective.

The current crisis represents what many consider Hamas’s most painful moment, but Professor Sami Al-Astal, an academic and researcher on Islamic movements, maintains that rebuilding the organization is not impossible.

“Hamas has suffered significant blows in recent decades, including the assassination of its founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in 2004 and the assassination of Hamas leader in Gaza, Abdul Aziz Rantisi, a month later,” he said. .

The political landscape facing Hamas’s next leaders appears increasingly complex. Khalil Al-Hayya and Khaled Meshaal have emerged as potential candidates for the top political post, although Al-Astal suggests that any new leadership must take into account the dramatic changes in Gaza’s demographic landscape and Hamas’s political topography .

It significantly highlights another possible option. “Forming a committee rather than appointing a single person to lead the movement is one of the possible options in these compelling circumstances, especially if it is difficult to easily and smoothly select a unanimously accepted person,” he says.

“Hamas cannot fully adhere to its basic system and established regulations,” Al-Astal continues. “The radical changes in the demographic composition of Gaza and in the political landscape of Hamas have affected the structure and levels of leadership of the organization at the second and third levels and beyond, reflecting the current state of devastation and destruction .”

Political analyst Iyad Al-Qurra emphasizes Hamas’s resilience and institutional structure. “The movement has political offices, advisory councils and a military wing, each operating within an institutional framework,” he explains.

It highlights Khalil Al-Hayya’s position as Sinwar’s deputy in the Gaza politburo, noting his “personal and activist credentials, his special relationships with former politburo chiefs Haniyeh and Sinwar, and his deep understanding of the internal and external dynamics of Hamas.

The impact of the Israeli war, however, extends beyond military losses to create what Al-Astal describes as “a divide between the organizational levels of Hamas and Palestinian public opinion in Gaza.” He notes that the population “wants to stop death, restore life and hope, and rebuild its educational, health and economic infrastructures”.

This public sentiment, combined with broader regional dynamics, could force Hamas’ new leaders to reconsider their strategic approach. “Hamas recognizes the support of the strongest nations in the world for Israel and their abandonment of the Palestinians,” observes Al-Astal.

“The denunciation of the Iranian axis and the severe blows dealt by the assassinations of Hezbollah leaders and Iranian officials in the region force the movement to take these developments into account in choosing its new leadership and policies.”

Despite devastating losses in Gaza during more than a year of war, affecting both its organizational and governmental apparatus through casualties and destruction of facilities, Hamas retains some capacity for governance, albeit extremely limited.

The movement continues to sporadically pay part of the salaries of its government employees, contributes to aid distribution efforts and maintains some police presence through plainclothes officers.

Al-Qurra rejects concerns about organizational instability following Sinwar’s death.

“The absence of a single person has not affected and will not affect Hamas’ adaptation, decision-making, negotiation management and external relations,” he said. He hopes for continuity in Hamas’ positions regarding prisoner exchange conditions, following the mechanisms previously established by Sinwar and agreed within Hamas.

“Al-Hayya is now leading the political file related to the prisoner exchange negotiations,” notes Al-Qurra, “and the military system is functioning in its own way, having naturally adapted for a whole year to face the challenges. Sinwar’s absence will have no impact on the resistance.

He emphasizes that “the file of negotiations will not change, and the file of Israeli prisoners and soldiers and the preservation of their lives does not depend on who will lead Hamas, because it is managed differently.”

As Hamas navigates this critical transition period, the movement faces the challenge of balancing its ideological commitments with the practical needs of Gaza’s devastated population.

The selection of new leadership could well indicate the future direction chosen by Hamas; somewhere between maintaining its historic stance of resistance and adopting a more pragmatic approach to ensuring the survival and reconstruction of Gaza.

This article is published in collaboration with Egab