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    • Why didn’t Doha warn the United States of Hamas’s attacks on Israel on October 7? – Israel News
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    Why didn’t Doha warn the United States of Hamas’s attacks on Israel on October 7? – Israel News

    Mars Posted on

    Hamas had planned for its massive October 7 attack to take place in 2022, but postponed the plans for various reasons, according to conclusions drawn from new documents discovered in Gaza.

    The documents, which are several pages long and also include meeting minutes and numerous images that Hamas had collected of Israeli targets, illustrate how far Hamas’s planning was by 2022. They also illustrate how Hamas considered different types of attacks. . It is unclear how far Hamas has progressed in some of these plans. Finally, the documents appear to illustrate that Hamas was deeply invested in coordinating with Iran and Hezbollah and briefing its Doha-based leadership.

    Reports on these documents raise many questions.

    The plan of the wall of Jericho

    Hamas’ plans go back several years, this was already known. In fact, Israel had obtained clues about this project, dubbed the “Wall of Jericho” plan – which Israel knew about before October 7.

    Israeli officials rejected this plan as well as IDF monitors’ warnings about Hamas’ preparations, but the fact is that some aspects of Hamas’ plan were known.

    The change of date of the commemoration is far from innocent. The house on Kibbutz Be’eri which was destroyed on October 7. (credit: ORI SELA)

    The new evidence highlights how Hamas appears to have widely shared this plan before the attack. This raises the question of why regional intelligence agencies as well as Western intelligence agencies have not become aware of this situation.

    Iran has denied any knowledge of the plan in the past. Additionally, reports have sought to claim that Hamas leaders in Doha were unaware of the genocidal attack.

    Doha told Israel before October 7 that Hamas only wanted money and had been dissuaded. If Hamas leaders in Doha knew about this, it raises the question of why Qatar, a U.S. ally, was unaware of this plan. If Doha knew this, it raises worrying questions as to why Israel was not informed.

    Hamas leaders seemed to know about this plan, outside of a small circle. Reports indicate that Khalil al-Hayya, a Hamas member, knew about it. Hayya met with the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Mohammed Said Izadi, in Lebanon. The fact that Hamas held meetings with the IRGC and this did not raise any alarm bells seems worrying. Other key Hamas members who participated in the plan included Yahya Sinwar, Sinwar’s brother Mohammed, Mohammed Deif, and Marwan Issa. Issa and Deif were killed during the war.

    Hamas’s plans progressed from its requests for support to Iran made in June 2021, just after the ten days of conflict that year, through April and November 2022. Steam continued to build until August 2023. Hamas wanted calm to hide its plans. He managed to get it. Israel has been distracted by the 2022 elections as well as threats from Hezbollah which forced Israel to enter into a US-brokered maritime deal with Lebanon. Israel has also been distracted by domestic politics in 2023, as well as the rise of a terrorist wave in the West Bank.

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    What we know now

    Overall, the new documents tell us several things. This tells us that Hamas did indeed attempt to coordinate with the IRGC in Iran and with Hezbollah.

    Iran likely coordinated with militias in Iraq and Yemen to prepare for the “big plan,” as Hamas called the preparation for war. Ismail Haniyeh, in Doha, was aware of these plans. Ismail Qaani, head of the IRGC’s Quds Force, was aware of these plans.

    However, other aspects of these documents raise questions. Hamas had been preparing the October 7 operation for years. It also seems that he imagined other plans, such as major attacks in Tel Aviv. How advanced were these plans? This question raises questions about Hamas’ overall planning process.

    The fact that Hamas kept the minutes of the meetings and put them on a computer, as well as the fact that Hamas members spoke with Hezbollah and the IRGC during the meetings, appear to call into question Hamas’ operational security.

    Storing secret terrorist meeting minutes and plans on a computer is a safe way to find those plans, unless the computer is never connected to the Internet or a network. All of this raises the question of why no other government in the region has been more involved in Hamas’s plans.

    While it goes without saying that many governments do not monitor Hamas communications, some do monitor Hezbollah or the IRGC. Additionally, Hamas leaders reside in Doha, a US ally.

    The discovery of Hamas’ plans, which were apparently discovered in January in Yahya Sinwar’s hometown of Khan Yunis, leaves many unanswered questions about October 7: What it tells us is that Hamas wanted a close coordination with Iran?

    It was always assumed that Iran was pushing for a multi-front war and the unification of “arenas” to encircle Israel.

    Hamas is now presented as a more important partner than in the past. Hamas pushed Hezbollah toward war with Israel. This is important and shows why many countries should have paid more attention to the growing danger from Hamas.

    The documents also increasingly give the impression that the Great March of Return protests in 2018 and the short-lived conflict of 2021 were dry runs for the October 7 attack.

    It also raises the question of whether the maritime deal in which Israel was pushed to appease Hezbollah helped make Hamas believe that Israel was weak.

    The desire to derail normalization with Saudi Arabia and attack Israel before new laser air defenses are deployed apparently also played into Hamas’ thinking and timing.



    Mars
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